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WHAT THE RETURN OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF 
THE UNITED STATES MEANS FOR 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Paul R. Verkuil* 
INTRODUCTION 
Administrative law, writ large, is about the way agencies behave, and 
how other institutions and the public react to that behavior. By promulgat-
ing rules, adjudicating cases and claims, enforcing statutes, providing 
guidance, collaborating with interest groups, exercising discretion, and so 
forth, agencies manage and implement the business of government.1 They 
do this under the auspices of the Executive Branch, but the other branches 
assert authority over the agencies as well. Congress does so by legislating, 
budgeting, and overseeing, while the courts do so by interpreting statutes 
and requiring rational behavior from agencies. These important and essen-
tial activities fill many law school publications with statutes, cases, and 
rules. But the branches that produce this body of law are institutionally 
constrained—they have difficulty testing hypotheses or experimenting with 
alternatives before statutes are enacted, cases are decided, or rules are 
promulgated.  
Congress and the courts often act in a data vacuum. True, Congress 
holds hearings and requests reports from the Government Accountability 
Office or the Congressional Research Service—but legislation often results 
from extraordinary events rather than from systematic study.2 When the 
courts use the common law process of incremental decision making, they can 
                                                                                                                      
 * Tenth Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS); 
President Emeritus, The College of William & Mary. Thanks to Reeve Bull, Jeff Lubbers, 
Michael McCarthy, David Pritzker, Scott Rafferty, and Jon Siegel for their assistance and 
advice on this Essay. 
 1. See Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 
1386–90 (2004) (describing the menu of policy-making tools available to federal agencies). 
 2. Congress, as the institution closest to the electorate, often responds to dramatic 
events rather than systematic studies. Indeed, statutes sometimes bear the name of their 
precipitating cause (e.g., The Lindbergh Law, The Brady Law, etc.). See Ethan Trex, 11 Laws 
Named After People, MENTAL FLOSS (Dec. 17, 2009, 12:43 PM), http://www. 
mentalfloss.com/blogs/archives/43307. 
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sharpen insights over time, but that process has now been overwhelmed  
by statutory law.3 Courts are institutionally unsuited to be experimenters.4 
The Executive Branch can review most agency regulatory agendas and rules 
through the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Office of Infor-
mation and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). However, OIRA has limited 
ability and time to try out alternatives or conduct empirical studies.5 The 
agencies have greater capacity in this regard—guidance can precede rules, 
for example—but they are also under pressure to act, not theorize, due to 
statutory deadlines, oversight hearings, and budget and personnel ceilings. 
The rulemaking process gives agencies the ability to learn before doing, but, 
too often, agencies begin with their positions staked out and their minds 
made up.6 On matters of procedure and process, there may be even less 
time available, despite the fact that experimentation and cross-agency com-
parisons could greatly improve agency performance.  
This is where ACUS comes in. The Conference studies the “efficiency, 
adequacy and fairness of the administrative procedure used by administra-
tive agencies in carrying out administrative programs.”7 The Conference 
                                                                                                                      
 3. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1-2 (1982) 
(recognizing that the courts are “choking on statutes” and advocating a common law ap-
proach to their revision and updating). 
 4. For due process reasons, trial courts are limited by record requirements and 
relevancy standards, except for a limited judicial notice capacity. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 201, 
401. Appellate courts are bound by the record below, except for amicus briefs, which can 
offer broader context. The Supreme Court has discretionary jurisdiction and a legal policy-
making role, but it lacks the institutional resources to find facts. In original jurisdiction 
cases, for example, facts are determined by special masters. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 53. 
 5. OIRA is a small shop with a big job; it reviews hundreds of agency regulations 
annually. Its capacity to experiment or “game” alternatives is very limited. OMB’s Office of 
Performance and Personnel Management conducts some empirically-based government 
initiatives, like employee surveys, but cannot do much experimental work either. 
 6. Cf. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492, 1494-95 
(1992) (comparing rulemaking processes to Kabuki theater in that they create the illusion of 
an exchange of views). One of the promises of e-rulemaking, the process of issuing notices 
and receiving comments over the Internet, is that it can open up the process at an earlier 
stage to facilitate greater agency interaction with the public. ACUS has a project underway 
to address this possibility. Agency Innovations in e-Rulemaking, ACUS, http://www.acus.gov/ 
research/the-conference-current-projects/e-rulemaking-study-of-agency-innovations/ (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2011).  
 7. 5 U.S.C. § 594 (2006). ACUS’s mandate is wisely limited to procedural matters, 
where bipartisan agreement is more likely to be found. Even those substantively opposed to 
the role of government in society can agree on the more neutral questions of process.  
Indeed, procedure encompasses principles of universal appeal. The philosopher Stuart 
Hampshire believes “fairness in procedures for resolving conflicts is the fundamental kind of 
fairness . . . fairness in procedure is an invariable value, a constant in human nature.” 
STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT 4 (2000). Of course, even procedure can have a 
political dimension. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1751 (2007); Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative 
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can be viewed as the government’s “laboratory” for administrative process 
and procedure. ACUS does not perform controlled experiments like the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) does;8 it conducts applied research by 
using empirically-based analyses to understand the way the administrative 
process works. It then transfers those insights to the agencies for action and 
follows up with agencies to ensure compliance with its recommendations. 
This implementation phase is also empirically-driven.  
For the Conference, agencies themselves are the laboratories. It views 
agencies not unlike how Justice Brandeis viewed states in the federal sys-
tem.9 Agency experimentation can lead to process systemization through 
the identification and expansion of best practices. Systemization has been 
part of ACUS’s mission from its inception. In 1960, Dean James Landis 
advised President John F. Kennedy to create ACUS with these words: “The 
concept of an Administrative Conference of the United States promises 
more to the improvement of administrative procedures and practices and to 
the systematization of the federal regulatory agencies than anything pres-
ently on the horizon.”10 
When the Conference engages an expert consultant for a study, it con-
nects the analytical world of academic research to the real world of 
administration. This has benefits for both sides. For the academy, Confer-
ence work helps address the longstanding criticism of legal scholarship’s 
lack of empiricism.11 There is an increasing awareness of the value of 
                                                                                                                      
Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 268–78 (1978) (describing the procedural conflicts 
behind the enactment of the APA). 
 8. See, e.g., Michael S. Lauer & Francis S. Collins, Using Science to Improve the Na-
tion’s Health System: NIH’s Commitment to Comparative Effectiveness Research, 303 JAMA 2182 
(2010) (describing how comparative effectiveness research drives scientific research at NIH). 
 9. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the Federal system that a single courageous state 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the country.”). Of course, ACUS looks to agencies for 
innovative procedural ideas, rather than social and economic experiments, but it similarly 
believes that agency experimentation, even if unsuccessful, can create important lessons for 
other agencies. 
 10. JAMES LANDIS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ELECT 74 (1960). President Kennedy 
established a temporary ACUS with Exec. Order No. 10,934, 3 C.F.R. 102 (1962). It was 
permanently established by statute in 1964 by President Johnson. Administrative Conference 
Act, Pub. L. No. 88-499, 78 Stat. 615 (1964) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 591-596 
(2006)). 
 11. The primary data set for legal researchers has long been the case law and statutes 
produced at the federal and state levels. Study of these data was defined by Christopher 
Columbus Langdell as a kind of scientific method. The legal realists challenged this vision 
of law in the 1930s by questioning the assumptions and motives of judges and legislators. 
Today, the legal realist inquiry itself has become empirically-based. See Thomas J. Miles & 
Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2008).  
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empiricism in law.12 Indeed, even the never-ending stream of articles on the 
Chevron doctrine has begun to shift in this direction.13 In general, however, 
studies of what agencies actually do still remain in short supply.  
This was not always true. Some of the best descriptions of what agen-
cies do were produced in the 1940s when the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) emerged. A highlight was Walter Gellhorn’s empirical studies of 
agencies for the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Proce-
dure.14 It is notable that Professor Gellhorn, a “founding father” of 
ACUS,15 continued to demand evidence-based reports from its consultants 
in his long tenure on the Council of the Administrative Conference, a fact 
to which I can personally attest. Even before Gellhorn, scholars like Ernst 
Freund had urged the study of “internal” administrative law—what agencies 
do rather than what the courts do to them.16 These earlier efforts under-
score Dean Landis’s notion that ACUS can, through empirical research on 
administrative law and process, systematize agency best practices. 
The Conference also adds value for agency officials. By engaging high-
ly focused and overworked bureaucrats with the world of scholarly analysis, 
ACUS facilitates an exchange of views that enhances the quality of admin-
istrative management. Agency officials welcome advice on how to improve 
their procedures and practices, and thoughtful critiques from ACUS are 
                                                                                                                      
 12. The growing interest in empirical studies has produced a peer-reviewed publication, 
the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies. See Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, WILEY-
BLACKWELL, http://www.wiley.com/bw/journal.asp?ref=1740-1453 (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). 
Outstanding empirical work has been done in administrative law.  
 13. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An 
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825 (2006); Peter H. Schuck & 
E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 
1990 DUKE L. J. 984. 
 14. Professor Walter Gellhorn, as Staff Director of the Attorney General’s Committee 
on Administrative Procedure, produced twenty-seven monographs detailing the processes 
and functions of individual agencies. See ATTORNEY GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. 
PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. DOC. NO. 77-
10 (1st Sess. 1941); ATTORNEY GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. DOC. NO. 76-186 (3d Sess. 1940).  
 15. Professor Gellhorn was appointed by President Kennedy to the Council of the 
Temporary Administrative Conference. He subsequently served on the Council of ACUS 
until his death in 1995. He was the only Council member granted, in effect, lifetime status. 
See Peter Strauss, A Memorial to Walter Gelhorn [sic], AM. BAR ASS’N, http:// 
apps.americanbar.org/adminlaw/news/vol21no3/gelhorn.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). 
 16. See ERNST FREUND, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, at v (2d ed. 1928) (stating 
that “administrative law continues to be treated as law controlling the administration, and 
not as law produced by the administration”). See generally Verkuil, supra note 7, at 266-67. For 
a valuable contribution that refocuses scholarship on what agencies do, see Sidney A. 
Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning Administra-
tive Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577 (2010). 
 
  
Spring 2012] What the Return of ACUS Means for Administrative Law 21 
well received. This does not mean, of course, that these officials simply 
accept the views of the Conference or its consultants. They fight hard for 
their positions, as our lively committee meetings amply demonstrate. In the 
end, reasoned recommendations based on facts make agency operations 
more efficient, effective, and fair—values that are touchstones of the ACUS 
mission.  
I. HOW ACUS WORKS 
ACUS is institutionally empowered to study what agencies do. It col-
lects “information and statistics” from agencies,17 and agency compliance 
with requests for data or interviews is the norm. The agencies view the 
Conference as a collaborator, not an overseer. This collegiality usually leads 
to cooperative undertakings, sometimes requested and funded by the agen-
cies themselves.  
Our 101 members comprise the Chairman, ten additional Council 
members appointed by the President (usually five from the government and 
five from the public), and ninety other members (fifty senior government 
officials and forty private citizens designated as “public members”).18 Nota-
bly, the current public members include individuals who have served in 
every presidential administration since that of Lyndon B. Johnson. The 
public members are selected on a bipartisan political basis, which ensures 
that the Conference’s work is as balanced as possible in an era of partisan 
division.  
When the Conference convenes in plenary session twice a year to de-
bate proposed recommendations, it is known as the Assembly.19 The fifty 
government members represent over 200 agencies or sub-agencies.20 When 
liaison representatives and Senior Fellows are added in, the resulting forum 
is deeply diverse politically, intellectually, and experientially. This remarkable 
                                                                                                                      
 17. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 591, 594 (2006). See generally H.R. REP. NO. 112-154, at 3–4 
(2011) (documenting the importance of ACUS’s mission to regulatory reform). 
 18. See ACUS, GUIDE FOR MEMBERS 3–4 (2011), available at http://www. 
acus.gov/about. The public members are practicing attorneys, scholars of administrative law 
or government, and others “specially informed by knowledge and experience” in administra-
tive procedures. See 5 U.S.C. § 593 (2006). 
 19. See 5 U.S.C. § 595 (2006). 
 20. See Government Members, ACUS, http://www.acus.gov/about/the-assembly/ 
government-members/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). Many of our members are general coun-
sels or chiefs of staff of executive departments, each of which have numerous sub-agencies 
under them. All of the departments are designated as members by the President, and the 
independent agencies are statutory members. Two hundred and eleven agencies are “repre-
sented” by ACUS in this manner. 
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Assembly, called a “public-private partnership” by President Obama,21 exists 
nowhere else and costs the government virtually nothing.22  
Ideas for projects are generated from a variety of sources, including rel-
evant committees on the Hill,23 organizations like the American Bar 
Association,24 and the Conference members themselves.25 The Conference 
staff creates project proposals that are approved by the Chairman and 
Council. Consultants are then sought (sometimes in-house) to carry out the 
projects under the direction of one of the six ACUS committees.26 These 
consultants, who have numbered in excess of 300 over the life of the Con-
ference, are a veritable “Who’s Who” of administrative law scholars.27 They 
produce reports with proposed recommendations that are vetted by the 
relevant committees and then voted on by the Conference as a whole. The 
discussions in committee and at the plenary session are conducted pursuant 
to the Federal Advisory Committee Act,28 which ensures two things: (1) 
that the public is informed of (and by our practice often participates in) the 
                                                                                                                      
 21. When President Obama named ten members of the Council on July 8, 2010, he 
said, “ACUS is a public-private partnership designed to make government work better . . . .” 
President Obama Announces More Key Administration Posts, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (July 8, 2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-announces-more-key-
administration-posts-7810. 
 22. The public members receive travel and per diem payments for the meetings they 
attend. ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., FY 2012 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
JUSTIFICATION 26 (2011), available at http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/ 
2011/02/ACUS-2012-Cong-Budget.pdf. The donated value of their time, however, if esti-
mated by hourly rates, amounts to an annual contribution to the government of over half of 
the Conference’s overall budget. 
 23. See SUBCOMM. ON COMMERCIAL & ADMIN. LAW OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 109TH CONG., INTERIM REP. ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PROCESS AND 
PROCEDURE PROJECT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Comm. Print 2006). 
 24. Letter from the Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Admin. Law & Regulatory Practice to 
Michael A. Fitzpatrick, Acting Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs (Aug. 18, 2009) 
(on file with ACUS) (setting forth potential projects for the re-initiated ACUS). 
 25. For example, the members met in breakout sessions during the December 2010 
plenary to propose new projects for the Conference. See Administrative Conference of the 
United States, 53rd Plenary Session, ACUS (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/ 
uploads/downloads/2011/01/Plenary-Transcript-53rd-Session.pdf (transcript of conference). 
Agencies also request assistance from ACUS for specific projects and workshops throughout 
the year. 
 26. See, e.g., Congressional Review Act RFP, ACUS (May 20, 2011), http://www. 
acus.gov/resources/congressional-review-act-rfp/ (soliciting proposals from potential con-
sultants). The six ACUS committees are the Committee on Adjudication, the Committee on 
Administration and Management, the Committee on Collaborative Governance, the Com-
mittee on Judicial Review, the Committee on Regulation, and the Committee on 
Rulemaking. The Committees, ACUS, http://www.acus.gov/about/the-committees/ (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2011). 
 27. A list of consultants has been compiled by Scott Rafferty, Deputy Director of 
Research and Policy, and will soon appear on the ACUS website. 
 28. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 2 (2006). 
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deliberations; and (2) that resulting recommendations are the work of the 
committees and the Assembly, not just the consultants or the staff.  
ACUS was revived in 201029 after fifteen years of darkness.30 It has 
since held two plenary sessions, during which the members voted to adopt 
five recommendations from ACUS-sponsored studies that reflect the em-
pirical nature of our research. The first recommendation, Preemption of State 
Law by Federal Agencies, deals with pressing issues of federalism that have 
produced numerous Supreme Court decisions. It was supported by a study 
performed by Professor Catherine M. Sharkey of New York University 
School of Law. Professor Sharkey’s empirical work involved extensive 
interviews with fifty people in federal and state government, and in-depth 
case studies of the regulatory rulemaking records of six federal agencies. 
There is little doubt that both the Recommendation (2010-1)31 and the 
resulting scholarly article32 benefited enormously from access to key players 
at agencies, and from the expert critiques provided by the government and 
public members of the Rulemaking Committee. 
                                                                                                                      
 29. The Conference officially returned on March 3, 2010, when I was confirmed by 
the U.S. Senate as Chairman. Administrative Conference of the United States—Paul R. Verkuil, 
U.S. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, http://judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/ 
111thCongressExecutiveNominations/AdminConfUS-PaulVerkuil.cfm (last visited Oct. 5, 
2011). President Obama appointed the ten additional members of the Council in July 2010, 
and it was fully staffed shortly thereafter. See Peter Orszag, ACUS is Back, OMBLOG (Jul. 9, 
2010, 8:21 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/blog/10/07/09/ACUS-is-Back. The 53rd 
Plenary Session was held in December 2010, and the 54th in June 2011. The Administrative 
Conference of the United States—2010 Plenary Session, COMMERCE.GOV (Dec. 13, 2010, 8:18 
PM), http://www.commerce.gov/os/ogc/developments/administrative-conference-united-states-
2010-plenary-session. 
 30. Orszag, supra note 29. Why the Conference was defunded in 1995 is a complicated 
question of legislative priorities, political shifts in power, and dissatisfaction with some 
recommendations. See generally Toni M. Fine, A Legislative Analysis of the Demise of the  
Administrative Conference of the United States, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 19 (1998). The entire first 
issue of Volume 30 of the Arizona State Law Journal is devoted to discussing the demise and 
possible revival of ACUS. 
The defunding of ACUS was seen as a mistake from the start, and many influential 
figures worked for its revival. The two most important voices were Justices Stephen G. 
Breyer and Antonin G. Scalia, the latter a former Conference member and Chairman. 
Administrative Conference of the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & 
Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 14-30 (2010) (statements of Justice 
Breyer and Justice Scalia). On August 1, 2011, right after the debt ceiling vote, the House 
voted 382 to 23 to reauthorize ACUS through 2014. Bill Summary & Status—112th Congress 
(2011-2012)—H.R. 2480—All Information, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR02480:@@@L&summ2=m&# (last visited Oct. 5, 2011). This is 
quite a bipartisan endorsement. 
 31. Agency Procedures for Considering Preemption of State Law, Recommendation 
2010-1, 76 Fed. Reg. 81 (Jan. 3, 2011).  
 32. Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521 (2012). 
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Professor Steven Balla of the Trachtenberg School of Public Policy and 
Public Administration at The George Washington University was the con-
sultant on the Rulemaking Comments project, which became 
Recommendation 2011-2.33 Rulemaking has long been an interest of the 
Conference, and the advent of new technology and social media make it a 
subject ripe for review. Professor Balla analyzed numerous rulemakings 
between 2008 and 2011 where there were reply comments from the public 
to agencies utilizing regulations.gov, which posts information on 123 gov-
ernment agencies. He sampled comments, then did extensive interviews 
and follow-up. In this case as well, ACUS connections made this empirical 
work possible. 
Perhaps the most extensive empirical study since ACUS’s revival was 
conducted for the Government Contractor Ethics project by Professor Kath-
leen Clark of Washington University School of Law. Government 
contractor ethics has become a subject of intense interest during the last 
two administrations because contractors, both military and civilian, have 
grown exponentially relative to full-time government employees.34 Profes-
sor Clark’s research involved over ninety initial and follow-up interviews 
with government and private sector personnel, and extensive meetings with 
officials at the Office of Government Ethics, the Office of Federal Pro-
curement Policy, and the Department of Defense. In addition, since 
contractor ethics rules are of intense interest to the private sector, meetings 
were held by our staff and Professor Clark with appropriate business inter-
ests and the public interest community. The resulting study35 and 
Recommendation 2011-336 are deeply supported by this empirical process. 
Finally, experiential learning was at the heart of the Agency Use of Video 
Hearings project done in-house by attorney-advisor Funmi Olorunnipa.37 
                                                                                                                      
 33. Rulemaking Comments, Recommendation 2011-2, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,791 (Aug. 9, 
2011), available at http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/06/COR-
FINAL-Rulemaking-Comments-Recommendation.pdf. 
 34. See, e.g., Paul C. Light, The New True Size of Government (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Pub. 
Serv. Organizational Performance Initiative, Research Brief No. 2, 2006), available at http:// 
wagner.nyu.edu/performance/files/True_Size.pdf. 
 35. Kathleen Clark, Financial Conflicts of Interest In and Out of Government (Wash. 
Univ. in St. Louis Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-02-03, 
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1785520##. 
 36. Compliance Standards for Government Contractor Employees—Personal Con-
flicts of Interest and Use of Certain Non-Public Information, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,792 (Aug. 9, 
2011).  
 37. See FUNMI E. OLORUNNIPA, AGENCY USE OF VIDEO HEARINGS: BEST 
PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES FOR EXPANSION 3 (2011), available at http://www.acus.gov/ 
wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/05/Revised-Final-Draft-Report-on-Agency-Use-of-Video-
Hearings-5-10-11.pdf (examining the experience of agencies that have already used video 
hearing technology and identifying potential uses of the technology by other agencies with 
high-volume caseloads). 
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This project involved demonstrations of new video hearing technology in 
the Social Security Administration’s disability hearing process, which led 
to a “best practices” recommendation, Recommendation (2011-4),38 for 
expanding the use of such technology to other high-volume caseload agen-
cies like the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review at the Department of Justice. Understanding the 
technology behind video hearings, and the opportunities it offers agencies 
for fair and efficient decision making, has the potential to transform gov-
ernment adjudications, while saving hundreds of millions of dollars, and 
reducing the delays that members of the public face in having their claims 
resolved.39 
These examples of ACUS studies and recommendations provide a 
glimpse of how empirical research can make government procedures and 
processes more fair, efficient, and effective.40 They are only the most recent 
examples of a Conference commitment to understanding how agencies 
work, and how to make them work better. From the beginning, Conference 
studies have employed data collection and interviews as research tech-
niques. In fact, the current Chairman, in an earlier life as a consultant to 
ACUS, contributed an empirical study that looked into how the informal 
adjudicative processes of forty-two agencies actually worked.41  
II. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
This new journal connects fields that are sometimes viewed as separate 
enterprises. But, in many ways, environmental law is administrative law.42 
Through its recommendation and research efforts, ACUS has at least 
viewed the fields as first cousins, if not siblings. It is appropriate to 
reemphasize these connections in this inaugural issue.  
                                                                                                                      
 38. Agency Use of Video Hearings: Best Practices and Possibilities for Expansion, 76 
Fed. Reg. 48,795 (Aug. 9, 2011).  
 39. In the immigration setting, the lengthy queues mean that those seeking asylum 
can be kept in detention for years before their cases can be heard. Kristen M. Jarvis Johnson, 
Fearing the United States: Rethinking Mandatory Detention of Asylum Seekers, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 
589, 590 (2007). 
 40. The fifth recommendation, Legal Considerations in e-Rulemaking, supported by 
an in-house study prepared by Bridget Dooling, a detailee from OIRA, has by its very 
nature less of an empirical bent. Still, it involved extensive interviews with agency general 
counsels and legal staff. Legal Considerations in e-Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,789 (Aug. 9, 
2011). 
 41. See Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 
739 (1976) (describing how many of the “procedural ingredients” required by Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), were actually present in a broad set of agency adjudications).  
 42. This assumes, of course, that the substantive and procedural limits that apply to 
the APA and ACUS also apply to the work of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
See supra note 7. 
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When the organizing mechanism of administrative law, the APA,43 was 
enacted in 1946, the field of administrative law was characterized by the 
work of the independent agencies, and adjudicatory decision making was 
the norm.44 This structure remained largely in place through the 1960s, 
when, because of its procedural advantages, rulemaking soon became the 
most significant aspect of agency practice.45 
With the advent of EPA in 1970, the focus of administrative law shifted 
dramatically.46 In some ways, the shift had occurred even earlier in Scenic 
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, which found an agency duty to 
consider “aesthetic, conservational and recreational aspects of power devel-
opment” in the Federal Power Act.47 This judicial expansion of regulatory 
responsibilities inspired the creation of EPA and gave environmental law 
enormous influence over the APA’s standing to sue requirements.48  
The creation of EPA was also an organizational milestone for govern-
ment. Administrative law has always been concerned with the allocation of 
powers among the branches and the role of independent and executive 
agencies.49 In 1970, President Nixon created the Ash Council under con-
gressionally-granted reorganization powers.50 The Council focused on the 
formation of EPA, which required the transfer of agency functions from 
numerous departments, and it debated the kind of agency that should be 
created to house these powers. The three choices were to place EPA within 
an existing department, to set it up as a free-standing executive agency, or 
to create it as an independent commission. Despite congressional desire for 
                                                                                                                      
 43. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
 44. Perhaps the most widely studied agency in those days was the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB), which employed large numbers of “hearing examiners” (now 
administrative law judges) and utilized the formal adjudication provisions of the APA. See, 
e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (discussing, 
in part, the use and meaning of the substantial evidence test under the National Labor 
Relations Act and the APA and the decision-making role of hearing examiners). 
 45. See, e.g., United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) (holding that 
rules can be used to reduce issues in adjudications).  
 46. In addition, 1970 was the year the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHAct) 
became law, putting workplace safety at the center of the labor/management agenda. Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590. 
 47. Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F. 2d 608, 616 (2d. 
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). 
 48. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972) (recognizing that, in addition 
to economic harms, non-economic harms like aesthetic and environmental harms can lay the 
basis for standing under the APA). See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.4.2 (5th ed. 2008). 
 49. See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of 
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984). 
 50. The Council (formally known as the President’s Advisory Council on Reorganiza-
tion) was created under the direction of Roy Ash, hence the Ash Council. 
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an independent commission,51 President Nixon decided by Executive Order, 
pursuant to reorganization authority,52 to create EPA as an independent 
agency in the Executive Branch,53 thereby transforming the regulatory 
landscape with a stroke of the Executive pen. The swiftness of that move 
seems unthinkable today. For example, more than a year after its creation, 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)54 remains without a 
confirmed director due to congressional challenges for, among other things, 
its not having been established as an independent agency.55  
The appointment and confirmation process has also changed dramati-
cally from what it was in 1970. President Nixon named William 
Ruckelshaus to be the first head of EPA, and he was confirmed two days 
after its creation was announced.56 President Obama is still negotiating 
with Congress to get the head of the CFPB confirmed. Moreover, reorgan-
ization power, which Congress granted to President Bush when he 
established the Department of Homeland Security in 2002,57 has now 
expired. President Obama must approach Congress for new reorganization 
authority if he wants to reorganize agencies like the Department of Com-
merce to focus on international trade and competiveness, for example.  
An emphasis on EPA’s regulatory scope came as a consequence of the 
deregulation movement of the 1970s. In discrediting economic regulation, 
that movement ushered environmental and safety regulation to the center 
                                                                                                                      
 51. See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization 
and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 467 (2008) (describing congres-
sional responses to creation of EPA). 
 52. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (Oct. 6, 1970) (providing 
the initial organization of EPA). 
 53. An “independent agency in the Executive Branch” means a free-standing agency 
rather than an executive department, like Health and Human Services. It is in contrast to 
“independent agencies,” which are run by commissioners who enjoy for-cause removal 
protections. See S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., THE FEDERAL 
EXECUTIVE ESTABLISHMENT: EVOLUTION AND TRENDS 31-38 (Comm. Print 1980) (de-
scribing different forms of government entities). 
 54. The CFPB was a result of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955–2113 (2010). 
 55. The Consumer Bankers Association recently said: “We would prefer to see the 
bureau run by a commission . . . [like] the Consumer Product Safety Commission . . . .” Ben 
Protess, Choice to Lead Consumer Bureau Shows an Aggressive Streak, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2011, 
at B5. The Senate and House members who support this view are holding up the confirma-
tion process. Their views reflect a long tradition of the party not in the White House 
preferring independent commissions to executive organizations. See Devins & Lewis, supra 
note 51, at 472–75.  
 56. Ruckelshaus was confirmed as Administrator of EPA on December 2, 1970, and 
sworn in on December 4, 1970. EPA, THE GUARDIAN: ORIGINS OF THE EPA (1992), availa-
ble at http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/publications/print/origins.html. 
 57. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2243. 
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stage of administrative decision making.58 By abolishing agencies such as 
the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
and limiting the regulatory missions of agencies like the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, the burden of agency policy making shifted from 
rate setting to regulation of social (or external) costs at EPA and the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Since these agencies 
are inevitably engaged in a policy-driven process, their decisions remain 
controversial and political. Not surprisingly, the most cited case in the 
federal courts, Chevron USA, Inc. v. NRDC,59 involved policy choices made 
by EPA.60 The Chevron “domain”61 dominates administrative law courses, 
and EPA regularly produces major Supreme Court opinions.62 If one 
measures an agency’s significance to administrative law by citation count, 
EPA is the clear winner. And even if one only counts the number of appel-
late decisions involving an agency, EPA ranks very high.63  
Moreover, another staple of administrative law courses, the OIRA 
regulatory review process, might not exist without the need to review rules 
produced by EPA and OSHA. The 1970s precursor to OIRA, President 
Nixon’s Quality of Life Review, was created largely to review EPA and 
OSHA rules.64 
Another way to measure the significance of EPA’s effect on administra-
tive law is to look at the work of ACUS. The Appendix lists the twenty-six 
environmental projects pursued by the Conference from 1971 to 1995.65 No 
agency’s activities have occupied the Conference as much as EPA’s, except 
                                                                                                                      
 58. See DAVID BOIES & PAUL R. VERKUIL, PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS 558–617 
(1977) (emphasizing the shift from economic to social-cost regulation). 
 59. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (exhibiting deferral to EPA’s policy expertise under the Clean 
Air Act). 
 60. Similarly, OSHA’s workplace safety mission led one Justice to call for a revival of 
the non-delegation doctrine. See Indus. Union Dept. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 
671–88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 61. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 
833 (2001). 
 62. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (finding that EPA had 
statutory power under the Clean Air Act to address global climate change). 
 63. If immigration appeals are set aside, EPA produced over ten percent of adminis-
trative agency cases in the courts of appeal in FY 2010. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS—2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE DIRECTOR 96 (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/judicialbusinespdfversion.pdf. 
 64. See James Tozzi, Advisory Bd., Ctr. for Regulatory Effectiveness, Address at the 
30th Anniversary of OIRA Event at George Washington University: OIRA’s Formative 
Years (May 20, 2011), available at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/20110523_OIRA_GWU_2.pdf. 
 65. See infra app. If the projects led to recommendations, these projects will soon be 
available on the ACUS website and the recommendations will be republished in the Federal 
Register. If the projects only produced reports, they will be available on Hein Online at a 
future date. 
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perhaps the Social Security disability program, whose process requirements 
continue to demand attention.66 It is very likely that the reborn Conference 
will continue to keep EPA and environmental law high on its agenda.67 
CONCLUSION 
New ventures are stimulating and creative, as I am sure the editors feel 
about this first issue. I have a little of that feeling myself after restarting 
ACUS from scratch, a process that included finding space, ordering furni-
ture and computers, and, most significantly, hiring staff. We have a 
wonderful esprit at ACUS, in large measure because everyone chose to join 
this exciting new venture. They are proud of ACUS and its deep tradition 
of empirical study of administrative law.  
I wish the Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law a 
long and productive life, much like the Conference has had, but without the 
fifteen-year gap from which we are just emerging. 
                                                                                                                      
 66. See OLORUNNIPA, supra note 37. 
 67. The recent ACUS recommendations on rulemaking received extensive comments 
from representatives of EPA during the committee process. See Legal Considerations in  
e-Rulemaking, supra note 40; Rulemaking Comments, supra note 33. 
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APPENDIX 




1971 Stolz NEPA Study –
1971 Flannery 








Enforcing the National Environmental 
Policy Act in Federal Agencies
– 
1972 Cramton-Boyer 








FAA Recommendations Implementing 
NEPA 
– 
1973 Hines-Nathanson Establishing an Environmental Court –
1973 Murphy 
Procedures for Resolution of Environmental 
Issues in Licensing Proceedings
73-6 
1974 Shaw 
Procedures to Ensure Compliance by Federal 




Judicial Review Under the Clean Air Act and 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act
76-4 
1979 Baram 
Regulation of Health, Safety and 












Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: 
The Case of Superfund
84-4 
1985 Boyer-Meidinger 
Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A 
Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits 
under Federal Environmental Laws
85-3 
1990 Baram 
Risk Communication by Regulatory 
Agencies in Protecting Health, Safety, and 
the Environment
90-3 
1990 Elliott et al. 




The Dormant Noise Control Act and 
Options to Abate Noise Pollution
92-6 
1992 Kornhauser-Revesz De Minimis Settlements Under Superfund 92-9
  




1992 Brickman et al. 
An Administrative Alternative to Tort 
Litigation to Resolve Asbestos Claims
– 
1992 Schatz Environmental Regulation in the Antarctic –
1993 Hornstein 
Regulating Pesticides: FIFRA Registration, 




Negotiating Survival: An Assessment of the 
Potential Use of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Techniques for Resolving 




An Evaluation of Negotiated Rulemaking at 
the Environmental Protection Agency
– 
1995 Healy 
An Evaluation of the Fairness and 
Effectiveness of the Judicial Review 
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